Friday, February 08, 2008
re-up, yeah i said gang, bruh:
Could it be that the Sunni tilt against al-Qaeda isn't permanent? Interests, not ideology, determine everything.

Mark Lynch and Ilan Goldenberg point out that real rifts are emerging between the Awakening Councils and the Iraqi Islamic Party. In Anbar, at least, the two groups are locked in a power struggle, with the Anbar Awakening Council threatening to "raise up weapons against the Islamic Party if we do not achieve our demands," according to one of the council's leaders. The blatant move to replace the IIP creates a disincentive for the IIP or its Sunni allies to push provincial elections in parliament, thereby entrenching the struggle and forestalling a ballot-based resolution. Old guards do not like to be replaced. The Shiites in Maliki's government don't really show themselves to be particularly keen on accelerated provincial elections either.

Now on top of that acrimony with the Sunni establishment, add al-Qaeda adopting what might be called a population-centric approach. The Washington Post:
The Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq is telling its followers to soften their tactics in order to regain popular support in the western province of Anbar, where Sunni tribes have turned against the organization and begun working with U.S. forces, according to group leaders and American intelligence officials.

The new approach was outlined last month in an internal communique that orders members to avoid killing Sunni civilians who have not sympathized with the U.S.-backed tribesmen or the government.

From internal documents and interviews with members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a picture emerges of an organization in disarray but increasingly aware that its harsh policies -- such as punishing women who don't cover their heads -- have eroded its popular support. Over the past year, the group has been driven out of many of its strongholds. The group's leadership is now jettisoning some of its past tactics to refocus attacks on American troops, Sunnis cooperating closely with U.S. forces, and Iraq's infrastructure.
Who knows whether this will actually happen. After all, over the last five months, AQI attacks on Awakening Councils and CL-- er, Sons of Iraq have doubled. Similarly, who knows if it'll be too little too late from AQI's perspective.

Still, Americans have always had a hard time accepting that Iraqis' reasons for doing what they do rarely reduce to the reasons we'd like them to adopt. The anti-AQI tilt occurred not because of some come-to-Jesus ideological overhaul in Anbar, but because AQI had overplayed its hand through violence and intimidation. If AQI backs off the violence and intimidation precisely when the Awakening Councils perceive themselves to be receiving a raw deal from the Iraqi government and the Sunni establishment, maybe the Sunnis un-tilt. Stranger things have happened.
--Spencer Ackerman