No. 663-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 29, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Mark R. C. Caguioa, 21, of Stockton, Calif., died May 24 at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., of wounds suffered on May 4 in Baghdad, Iraq, when the vehicle he was in struck an improvised explosive device. He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

No. 665-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 662-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 661-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 29, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Marine Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Sgt. Nicholas R. Walsh, died May 26 from wounds suffered while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. He was assigned to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Camp Pendleton public affairs office at (760) 725-5044.

No. 654-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Spc. Erich S. Smallwood, 23, of Trumann, Ark, died May 26, near Balad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.

He was assigned to A Company, 875th Engineer Battalion of the Arkansas Army National Guard in Marked Tree, Ark.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Arkansas Army National Guard public affairs office at (501) 212-5020.

No. 653-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Lake-Ackerman diavlog on Iraq. Eli refers to this as the Care Bears edition, as you could be forgiven for thinking we have a crush on each other. Fancy a treacle?

Here's my Comment Is Free assessment of Maliki after his first year in office. A commenter usefully points out that I blithely referred to the Interior Ministry as "Maliki's," when in fact it's under the control of SIIC. Still, though, the broader point stands, which is that Maliki's sectarian agenda matches that of the Interior Ministry's rather seamlessly. The rest of his record suggests things wouldn't be different if Maliki managed to install a Da'wa figure at Interior. But I should have clarified that point. Thanks, internet, for your corrective distributed intelligence!

Happy Memorial Day.

In an April 17 report written for the United States government, Dennis Pluchinsky, a former senior intelligence analyst at the State Department, said battle-hardened militants from Iraq posed a greater threat to the West than extremists who trained in Afghanistan because Iraq had become a laboratory for urban guerrilla tactics. (snip)

The test case here is a foiled plot to blow up Amman's Queen Alia International Airport. In essence, jihadists came together -- a bomb-maker from Iraq, a prison-furloughed radical from Libya, a Damascus ringleader -- in areas of Syria where the Iraqi diaspora now resides and in the volatile Jordanian city of Zarqa, home to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Expect the 2-million-and-growing Iraqi refugee population in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere to be a prime stomping ground for jihadis looking to plan attacks in the region and beyond. That will become true central front of the war on terror.

No. 652-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 28, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. He died May 25 in Taji, Iraq, of injuries suffered when his unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire during combat operations.

Spc. Mathew P. LaForest, 21, of Austin, Texas, was assigned to 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0154 or (253) 967-0147.

No. 651-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 28, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died May 24 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle.

They were assigned to 1st Brigade Transition Team, and attached to the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas.

Killed were:

Sgt. 1st Class Robert E. Dunham, 36, of Baltimore, Md.

Staff Sgt. Russell K. Shoemaker, 31, of Sweet Springs, Mo.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Riley public affairs office at (785) 239-3410.

No. 650-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 27, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 23 in Al Nahrawan, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle.

They were assigned to 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Benning, Ga.

Killed were:

Cpl. Victor H. Toledo Pulido, 22, of Hanford, Calif.

Cpl. Jonathan D. Winterbottom, 21, of Falls Church, Va.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Benning public affairs office at (706) 545-3512; after hours, call (706) 545-2218.

No. 648-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 26, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Iosiwo Uruo, 27, of Agana Heights, Guam, died May 24, in Buhriz, Iraq, of wounds suffered when his unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire.He was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0152 or (253) 967-0147.

No. 646-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 647-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 25, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 23 of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their unit in Ramadi, Iraq.They were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Steve Butcher Jr., 27, of Penfield, N.Y. He died in Ramadi, Iraq.

Pfc. Daniel P. Cagle, 22, of Carson, Calif. He died in Balad, Iraq.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Stewart public affairs office at (912) 767-2479.

Very very preliminary read of the SSCI report. In October 2002 and January 2003 -- the January 2003 NIE we knew about -- the intelligence community circulated to the Bush administration several analyses warning that postwar Iraq would most likely be a nightmare.

A post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so. ...

Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each other or the United States -- Sunni against Shia; Kurd against Kurd; Kurd against Arab; any against the United States -- would also encourage terrorist groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks within Iraq. ...

Some elements in the Iranian government could decide to try to counter aggressively the U.S. presence in Iraq or challenge U.S. goals following the fall of Saddam by attempting to use their contacts in the Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent against the U.S. presence and complicate the formation of a new, pro-U.S. Iraqi government. ...

Needless to say, there are a ton of political reasons why these warnings weren't heeded, not least of which that they cast serious doubt on the wisdom of invading Iraq. But there's another reason that might be even more determinative in a strict sense. From the SSCI's introduction:

Current and former intelligence officials told the Committee that intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing assessments about postwar Iraq because it was not an issue that was well-suited to intelligence collection. Accordingly, most prewar assessments cite relative few intelligence sources. Analysts based their judgments primarily on regional and country expertise, historical evidence and analytical tradecraft.

And you just can't have that, as Frank demonstrated quite excellently. "Regional and country expertise, historical evidence and analytical tradecraft" were considered the tools of a hidebound, unreliable and disloyal intelligence apparatus.

Another slice of the Senate Intel Committee's Phase II report: this time, it's the wrath of pre-war intel-community assessments of postwar Iraq, and it's just released. (Big big PDF.)

The Maliki government wants parliamentary immunity from prosecution removed for 15 Sunni politicians, including "almost all" of Saleh Mutlak's National Dialogue Council. Well, Mutlak is ready to pick up his marbles and go home anyway, but removing his immunity gives him precious little reason to stay in the political process. One of Mutlak's deputies, Khalaf al-Ayan, is believed by both Maliki and the U.S. military to be implicated in a number of attacks as a member of the Islamic Army of Iraq. Eli:

An American military official this week confirmed to The New York Sun that on April 3, American forces raided Mr. Ayan's house in Yarmouk and found stores of TNT that matched the kind used in the suicide belt that detonated on April 12 at the Iraqi parliament's cafeteria. That blast killed a member of parliament, Mohammed Awad, a Sunni Arab member of Mr. Ayan's Dialogue Front, yet the terrorist who killed him is believed to have been a member of Awad's security detail.

But the background on Mr. Ayan, who has threatened to return to "resistance" if the political process does not yield to the demands of his Sunni constituency, also implicates him in a string of attacks in Mosul on May 17 that detonated bridges and blew up a police station, according to one senior Iraqi Sunni official and an American intelligence officer who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the investigation. A raid last week on his parliamentary offices, in which American forces participated, yielded time-stamped before-and-after photos of the attacks, according to these sources.

Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed credit for the May 17 attacks, as it did for the parliament bombing. Mr. Ayan is believed to be the political leader of a rival of that group, the Islamic Army of Iraq, suggesting that the two organizations are cooperating. "The Islamic Army of Iraq coordinates attacks with Al Qaeda," the senior Iraqi official said. "The insurgency has consolidated."

Much of this is murky. Even granting that Ayan is a member of the IAI, the IAI is an enemy of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which takes credit for the parliament bombing. It's difficult to credit the idea that IAI collaborated with AQI on the attacks, since the only plausible rationale for such cooperation is to attack the collaborators in the government... Ayan among them. Still, the time-stamped photographs are pretty damning. It's simultaneously possible for Maliki to be primarily interested in purging Sunni rivals -- among the 15 is Mohammed al-Daini, who helped expose an Interior Ministry torture chamber last year -- and for those rivals to have done the dirt.

No. 640-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 24, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Announces Change-In-Status of Army Soldier

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom who was previously listed as Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown.

Pfc. Joseph J. Anzack Jr., 20, of Torrance, Calif., was captured May 12 by enemy forces in Al Taqa, Iraq, when his unit was attacked by insurgents using automatic fire and explosives.

His body was recently recovered in Iraq.The circumstances surrounding his capture and death remain under investigation.

Anzack was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Drum public affairs office at (315) 772-8286.

No. 644-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 25, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Benjamin J. Ashley, 22, of Independence, Mo., died May 24 in Balad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Ashley was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Riley public affairs office at (785) 239-3410.

No. 639-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 24, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 22 in Taji, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their unit.They were assigned to the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), Fort Lewis, Wash.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Kristopher A. Higdon, 25, of Odessa, Texas.

Pfc. Robert A. Worthington, 19, of Jackson, Ga.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0152 or (253) 967-0147.

Staff Sgt. David C. Kuehl, 27, of Wahpeton, N.D., died May 22 in Taji, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his unit.He was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0152 or (253) 967-0147.

Q Mr. President, a new Senate report this morning contends that your administration was warned before the war that by invading Iraq you would actually give Iran and al Qaeda a golden opportunity to expand their influence, the kind of influence you were talking about with al Qaeda yesterday, and with Iran this morning. Why did you ignore those warnings, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Ed, going into Iraq we were warned about a lot of things, some of which happened, some of which didn't happen.

Looks like Bob Gates and Mike McConnell were serious about deconflicting control of intelligence assets between the Defense Secretary and the Director of National Intelligence. ODNI announced this morning that Gates's undersecretary of defense for intelligence, James Clapper, will also serve as overall head of defense intelligence for McConnell:

As the Director of Defense Intelligence, Clapper will report directly to the DNI
and serve as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. The
director of defense intelligence will have responsibilities as determined by the
DNI in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and promulgated separately.

The secretary and the director made this agreement in recognition of the
crucial importance of coordinated intelligence efforts to the national security
of the United States. The defense intelligence components provide a full
range of intelligence products and analysis to a broad spectrum of consumers;
from military forces in the field to senior policy makers across the federal
government. These efforts are intertwined with the national intelligence
efforts overseen by the DNI.

“The creation of the Office of the Director of Defense Intelligence is in
recognition of the importance of coordinated intelligence efforts to the
national security of the United States,” said Clapper. “This office will serve to
strengthen the relationship between the DNI and the DoD.”

Clapper's predecessor, Steve Cambone, served as an alternate center of power to first the CIA and then the ODNI. Now, Clapper actually works for ODNI. An interesting question will be whether this arrangement will last through to the next administration, or whether the USD-I position will remain the SecDef's instrument of control over the nearly 90 percent of the intelligence budget that the Pentagon controls.

Next up from the Iraq trip: this piece, just out in the Washington Monthly, on the political implications of what the surge means for the troops -- which is to say, hope. I didn't expect to see such a massive amount of optimism for the surge when I went to Baghdad, but there it was. Here's my attempt to think it through.

(I should also add that the whole issue of the Monthly is great: the cover package has some amazing stuff from my friends & esteemed colleagues Andrew Exum and Phil Carter; you've got Matt on Bob Shrum; Laura on Qubad Talabani, the KRG's man in DC; and the Boogie Down's own Chris Hayes on newfound CEO affection for government. Enjoy)

No. 635-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 24, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of three soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 21 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered whenmultiple improvised explosive devices detonated near their vehicle.They were assigned to the 425th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Shannon V. Weaver, 28, Urich, Mo.

Sgt. Brian D. Ardron, 32, of Acworth, Ga.

Spc. Michael W. Davis, 22, of San Marcos, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the U.S. Army Alaska public affairs office at (907) 384-1542.

No. 634-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 24, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Robert J. Montgomery Jr., 29, of Scottsburg, Ind.,died May 22, in Al Jabour, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his unit.He was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the U.S. Army Alaska public affairs office at (907) 384-1542.

No. 632-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 23, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Pvt. Oscar Sauceda Jr., 21, of Del Rio, Texas, died May 22, in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when his unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire.He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Riley public affairs office at (785) 239-3410.

Anbar Salvation Council plus Sadr plus... Petraeus? The Post's big story on the U.S.'s evolving political strategy in Baghdad suggests that the U.S. would be amenable to such a partnership:

Finally, the campaign plan aims to purge Iraq's leadership of a small but influential number of officials and commanders whose sectarian and criminal agendas are thwarting U.S. efforts. It recognizes that the Iraqi government is deeply infiltrated by militia and corrupt officials who are "part of the problem" and are maneuvering to kill off opponents, install sectarian allies and otherwise solidify their power for when U.S. troops withdraw, said one person familiar with the plan. ...

Also part of the plan is reaching out to grass-roots groups such as tribes, religious leaders and provincial administrators that are moving forward on reconciliation efforts, said Kilcullen, noting a tribal agreement in Babil province last week to end violence and a tribal movement in Anbar to oppose al-Qaeda. "We should not restrict our view of what a 'political' settlement is, solely to the Iraqi government -- civil society also has a really key role to play."

Efforts at negotiated settlements brokered by U.S. and Iraqi officials will extend to a broad spectrum of Iraqi groups, including some that have killed U.S. troops -- a source of consternation for some U.S. officers. But they will exclude groups such as al-Qaeda that are considered "irreconcilable," officials said.

The Sadrists have played a major part in transforming Iraqi ministries into outposts of sectarian advantage. But if their efforts to align with Sunni organizations like the ASC are trustworthy -- something the Sunnis will have to decide, not the U.S. -- then perhaps reconciliation should trump prior bad behavior. Maybe this treats the Sadrists with undue credulity, but brokering some kind of durable framework against prolonged sectarian warfare means recognizing that the Sadrists have a ton of influence among Shiites.

Then there's the Maliki issue. The Post, like the Los Angeles Times a few days ago, reports that no one in the Bush administration, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad or in Petraeus's brain trust has much faith in Maliki -- despite what Bush says publicly -- but there's even less of an appetite for engineering his downfall. Both Iyad Allawi and SIIC -- in the form of Adel Abdul Mehdi, who's said to be a favorite of ex-NSC Iraq hand Meghan O'Sullivan -- are angling for Maliki's job. But neither they nor Maliki have the combination of proven constituency and pan-sectarian potential that a Sadr-ASC-led coalition would possess. That coalition would inevitably be destabilizing to the Maliki government -- but the U.S. might see that as an opportunity for to get on the right side of Iraqi political development, rather than an Iraqi move toward the extremes.

Would it happen? Braintruster David Kilcullen gives the Post this explanation, which could break either way:

"Our notion of 'reconciliation' . . . is not necessarily where Iraqis are at right now," said Kilcullen, explaining that the word has no equivalent in Arabic. "The tribal and community leaders I talk to are more pragmatic and are looking for a compact or a settlement that brings an end to the violence. Restoring relationships is separate."

It could be that Kilcullen means acquiescing to whatever minimal or fig-leaf reconciliation measures Maliki puts forward. Alternatively, he could mean embracing new cross-sectarian coalitions that emerge from below, even if they weaken Maliki. If I were Maliki, though I'd be hoping that Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi doesn't go to Najaf to woo the Sadrists.

No. 627-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 23, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Marine Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two Marines who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lance Cpl. Benjamin D. Desilets, 21, of Elmwood, Ill.

Cpl. Julian M. Woodall, 21, of Tallahassee, Fla.

Both Marines died May 22 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. They were assigned to 3rd Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the II Marine Expeditionary Force public affairs office at (910) 451-7200

Mutlak might be waiting for Sadr to take a step. Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi's ISI-hunting Anbar Salvation Council isn't. Wow.

In an unprecedented step, a top leader of the pro-US tribal alliance in Anbar Province traveled to Sadr City Tuesday to meet with leaders of the Sadrist current.

Sheikh Hamid al-Hayis, who leads the armed wing of the US-backed movement known as the Anbar Awakening, or the Anbar Salvation Council, held a rare meeting with Sadrist leaders in Baghdad’s Sadr City, the bastion of support for the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and stronghold of the Mahdi Army.

“This meeting is a message to Iraqi politicians to get rid of their differences and to seek real reconciliation,” Hayis said, according to the AFP.

“We are trying to pressure (the government) to make political changes for the sake of the Iraqi people who are drowning in the blood of their sons,” Hayis added.

“This visit shows that Iraqi tribes are standing side by side and they are the nail in the coffin of the abhorrent sectarianism which has split our country,” said Shi'a Sheikh Malik Sewadi al-Mohammedawi, whom AFP identifies as the head of one of Sadr City’s most influential tribes.

According to a Sadr spokesman, Abdul Sattar will visit Sadr -- in Najaf. That's right, Najaf: the holiest city in Shiite Iraq, which just so happens to be under the control of Sadr's rivals in the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council. If this pans out, Sadr will be bringing the anti-takfiri Sunnis to Najaf, parading under the noses of his rivals that he's the authentic repository of both real Shiite protection and Iraqi nationalism.

Also:

(Sadr City's Shi'a Sheikh Malik Sewadi) Mohammedawi blamed the country’s sectarian strife on “occupation forces and foreign takfiris,” using a common term for Sunni extremists, derived from the practice of takfir, or branding fellow Muslims as unbelievers.

OK. If this is really happening, Sadr's people will be dealing with the Anbar Salvation Council, which consists of -- to put it bluntly -- collaborators with the occupation forces. This is a fairly strong signal that al-Qaeda has fucked up so overwhelmingly that now the Sadrists don't consider "collaboration" to be a deal breaker for prospective partnerships.

Now, there's a certain alliance of convenience here: both the Salvation Front and the Sadrists seek to undercut their inter-sectarian rivals, and neither particularly like the Maliki government. Fine! A pathway out of the death-spiral of sectarian warfare, combined with a mutual interest in extirpating al-Qaeda that's greater than a desire to kill Americans -- well, that's, that's, that's... as much as you could possibly ask for. A timetable for withdrawal would probably sweeten the pot here considerably.

Perhaps Miguel Yglesias will scream at this, as the tendrils of History constrict 'twixt his throat. As for the other one, I'm not so sure.

No. 626-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 625-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 22, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Jason A. Schumann, 23, of Hawley, Minn., died May 19 in Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Schumann was assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Polk, La.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Polk public affairs office at (337) 531-4630.

Let me take you on a journey into the beating heart of war journalism. What happens when you've got a quote that seems vivid and redolent, rich in texture, emitting a bouquet of meaning and insight, but... may in fact be a word salad? The answer: print that sucker. Indulge me here.

Kevin reads my Nation piece, pulls out this passage

The MOI is the Ministry of Interior, arguably the most powerful department in the Iraqi bureaucracy. It has control of the police, and since 2005 it has been an instrument of Shiite political power....Haider gets nervous when I press him about MOI complicity with the militias. He picks up a can of Pepsi from his desk. "I can't say anything about the MOI, but here's an example. This is a soda. You know what it is, and what it consists of."

and remarks, "Say what?" Rightly so. Let me explain.

The vast majority of my Baghdad interviews were conducted through translation, helpfully provided by the 57th MPs. Not all of the Iraqi police were keen to talk to me. One fellow, named Lieutenant Colonel Ali, told me that he'd simply tell me nothing: he wasn't authorized to talk to the press, and didn't want to get in trouble. Fine. It happens.

In Khadimiya, Colonel Haider was pretty open to talking to me after Lt. Sherrill indicated that it was OK with him. I immediately started asking him about militia infiltration in the station, as just minutes before, his cousin & logistics officer, Major Ali, had told me it was a huge problem. (The NYT today surveys the extent of militia-enforced Shiite control of the neighborhood Haider & Ali police.) He pointed to the Ministry of Interior as the source of the problem. I continued to ask him about this.

All of a sudden, a routine U.S. checkup on his operations became a case of an American reporter, escorted by the very U.S. soldiers checking up on the station, pressing him about the perfidies of his superiors. He grabbed a soda can on his desk, gave me that quote, and evaded further questions. Now, as I wrote down Haider's words, I thought to myself: Yeah, that's right... a soda. I know exactly what it is, and what it consists of. Much like I know what the MOI consists of. A soda can consists of soda!* The MOI consists of Shiite militiamen! Well played, Colonel Haider.

Later that day, as I was composing an e-mail to friends and family that helped me organized my thoughts from the day's interviews, it occurred to me that the more I thought about it, the less I know about what a can of soda consists of. High-fructose corn syrup? Do they even use that in the Iraqi version of Pepsi? I thought it better not to be overly literal. Even through translation, and through his rather understandable caution, Haider was clearly telling me that the MOI was what it was. Maybe the quote worked better in Arabic. But the trouble remained: Haider's attempt to clarify the matter was in direct contrast to his method of expressing himself.

So I must have gone back and forth with taking that quote out of the piece a million times. If I took it out, I would have a situation where I took the reader right up to the edge of raising the MOI trouble but not crossing the threshold. I tried paraphrasing: "Haider suggests that the Ministry knows everything about the militia presence in the station," or some permutation. But I figured a reader would justifiably want to know what the guy actually said, particularly if he was levying such a big charge. I combed through my notes for similar quotes, and while nearly every police commander blamed the MOI at least partially for infiltration, it would have been awkward to suddenly switch characters, especially because I wanted to ground the piece in a specific police station. So, finally, I opted for the Pepsi quote, and figured that it would make sense in context.

Tell me, faithful commenters: was this a mistake? Be my ex-post-facto editor. Citizen journalism advances another step!

* UPDATE: Wow, is this bad writing. A soda can does not consist of soda. It contains soda. Woe to the holder of the soda can that consists of soda.

Via Slogger, Saleh Mutlak -- ex-Baathist leader of the smaller, harder-line Sunni parliamentary bloc, the National Dialogue Front -- says the political process is nearing its midnight hour:

Interviewer: This means that what you are doing is opposing a legitimate government?

Saleh al-Mutlak: This is true, we give them legitimacy, and we know that well. And we asked this of the currents that are near to us in our nationalist line, that they not participate in the Parliament or the government after we saw how the results of the elections were forged. But we were unable to convince them -- especially the Tawafuq Front –- of this position, even today.

We seek at the current time to convince the currents who are near to us to withdraw collectively from the Parliament, because the withdrawal of the Dialogue Front alone will not be influential, especially since we only have 11 members in the Parliament. Rather, our withdrawal could be heartening to others. But this does not meant that we have shut the door on withdrawal, but we have taken measures with the goal of pressuring the other powers to withdraw. In this period, we are practicing an approach of persuasion and mutual understanding, with the goal of bringing down the political process, and to concentrate pressure from the street on them.

Interviewer: The word “withdrawal” has been heard in more than one place, but it has not been spoken to the government or the occupation forces?

Saleh al-Mutlak: Most unfortunately, this is what is happening, such that it’s become the brandishing of withdrawal without meaning, and therefore we had appealed to our brothers in Tawafuq, and specifically in the Islamic Party to apply their threat, otherwise the Iraqi street is fated for frustration.

And they (i.e. Tawafuq Front and the Islamic Party) are in an unenviable position, ultimately, for if we leave behind the dossiers that we are calling for, the test of the constitution still remains in front of the Islamic Party. This subject (of the constitution) is supposed to be decided today, not tomorrow. Specifically, the legal period, set out in the constitution for amending it ended in the middle of this month. So when they couldn’t reach an agreement, they extended it, in a clear constitutional breach. And yet this isn’t the first time that the constitution is violated, but rather it is violated whenever they want to violate it. I believe that it will remain violated because it is not a sound constitution.

And here, the Islamic Party specifically, and the Tawafuq Front especially, are in an acute test, for if the constitution continues without essential amendments, I believe the Iraqi street will interpret this with strong response, because they (Tawafuq Front, Islamic Party) are the ones who promised the street that that they would work to change the constitution according to Article 142, and for this reason they asked the Iraqis to vote yes on the constitution, in the hope of changing it. And if they are not able to change it, and if the country will fall into catastrophe, they are the ones who caused it. Therefore they could withdraw (from the political process) over this matter specifically.

Tariq al-Hashemi's flirtation with abandoning the parliament invited Mutlak's attempt to outflank him with a harder line. The Sunnis threaten withdrawal all the time, so we'll see if this latest venture is anything more substantive. But it's little wonder that, according to David Ignatius, many in the Bush administration are abandoning the idea that they can compel Iraqi reconciliation.

Interestingly, here's what Mutlak has to say about Moqtada Sadr's recent outreach to the Sunnis:

Interviewer: Where does the Sadrist current stand today in Iraq?

Saleh al-Mutlak: The Sadrist current has taken some apparently good positions, and if it were possible to interpret them as becoming part of a real initial policy that it is committed to, and if it tries to be rid of its militias, and becomes a part of the nationalist current, then I believe that it is possible for it to do something fruitful for Iraq.

However, if it continues in this policy that oscillates, one time taking positions on the right, and another time taking positions on the left . . . . The problem is that the mob aspect is overrunning it today, and if it continues in this way, it will not be possible to present an influential status in Iraq.

Cautious, noncommittal, not exactly trusting. In essence, he's waiting for Sadr to make some dramatic gesture, especially as he ascribes the worst sectarian abuses of the Sadrists to "the mob aspect" and not Sadr himself.

No. 623-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 22, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of six soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 19 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle.They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Christopher Moore, 28, of Alpaugh, Calif.

Sgt. Jean P. Medlin, 27, of Pelham, Ala.

Spc. David W. Behrle, 20, of Tipton, Iowa.

Spc. Joseph A. Gilmore, 26, of Webster, Fla.

Pfc. Travis F. Haslip, 20, of Ooltewah, Tenn.

Pfc. Alexander R. Varela, 19, of Fernley, Nev.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

THFTNR buddy Chris Allbritton has a great exploration of Fatah al-Islam, the Palestinian al-Qaeda affiliate currently fighting a pitched battle with Lebanese security forces in Tripoli and outside Chris's place in Beirut. Several of Chris's sources view FaI as a Syrian proxy, "imitation al-Qaeda, a 'Made in Syria' one":

Al Abssi used to be a member of the main Palestinian faction, Fatah, founded by former PLO chairman Yassir Arafat. He later joined Fatah al-Intifada, a fake group set up by Syria in an attempt to turn Palestinians’ national yearnings to Syria’s advantage. But with little support among the Palestinian population, which by and large stayed loyal to homegrown groups such as Fatah and Hamas, Fatah al-Intifada languished. Last year, in a bid to strike out on his own, (journalist Kassem) Kassir said, Al Abssi split and formed Fatah al-Islam.

It was possibly a natural split, he said, because Al Abssi is a Jordanian of Palestinian descent with ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who was killed last year. Today he gets money and men from Salafist groups in the Gulf, Iraq and Jordan who share his jihadist view of an Islamic caliphate stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.

No. 622-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Don't miss Kay Steiger's piece on PTSD. I had an eerie experience at one of Camp Liberty's recreation tents in March, where to the left of me a bunch of guys were killing time playing World of Warcraft and to the right of me a mental-health seminar was underway for soldiers about to go home on R&R. The major instruction was about keeping alert for signs of suicidal behavior. Kay:

Robert Bray of the Thought Field Therapy Center of San Diego said that the reimbursements given by TRICARE for treating veterans are so modest in comparison to private practice as to discourage psychologists and psychiatrists from treating veterans with PTSD symptoms. He advocates making veterans' health coverage similar to a private insurance policy that would allow them to be treated in private practice and have the VA or DOD cover most of the bill, rather than dealing with the long waiting periods for an appointment in the VA system.

I'll leave health care policy to my friends who, unlike me, know something about it, but this is clearly unacceptable.

No. 621-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 620-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 21, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Justin D. Wisniewski, 22, of Standish, Mich., died May 19 in Lutfiyah, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his unit.He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Drum public affairs office at (315) 772-8286.

No. 619-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 618-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 21, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 18 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their unit came in contact with enemy forces using an improvised explosive device and small arms fire.They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Killed were:

Sgt. 1st Class Scott J. Brown, 33, of Windsor, Colo.

Spc. Marquis J. McCants, 23, of San Antonio.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the 82nd Airborne Division public affairs office at (910) 432-0661.

Jeff Goldberg writes:

I too have felt the urge to drown myself after spending too much time on the Al Jazeera Web site. Did you know that Al Jazeera has a section called "Conspiracy Theories"? Such a service to humankind, that network!

Not to hold a brief for al-Jazeera, but Goldberg might be mistakenly looking on this website, which isn't al-Jazeera's, despite its deliberate attempt to confuse people. al-Jazeera's English-language wesbite is here, and it doesn't include a "Conspiracy Theories" page. I've never been tempted to kill myself when reading it.

My piece from Baghdad for The Nation is out in the June 4 issue. Matt asks about the wisdom of divorcing the mechanics of training Iraqi security forces from the political development that training is supposed to support. Lo and behold, that's what the piece highlights.

Even directors of national intelligence need to fear the passive voice. Mike McConnell on adapting FISA to the post-9/11 world:

Because the law has not been changed to reflect technological advancements, we are missing potentially valuable intelligence needed to protect America.

To review: after September 11, the intelligence community and the Bush administration considered FISA too cumbersome for surveillance purposes. The administration enjoyed a political moment in which it could have passed through congress nearly any change in law it wished, no matter how dramatic a departure they represented, as evidenced by the administrative subpoena and national-security-letter provisions of the Patriot Act. Instead, it resisted efforts in 2002 to make FISA warrants easier to acquire, preferring to bypass FISA entirely, and to bypass those -- the FISA Court, James Comey, John Ashcroft -- who would have or who would eventually see that as... problematic. When the New York Times exposed the warrantless surveillance program, the administration spent a year contending that it was impossible to fit the program within FISA, only to reverse itself completely in January. That's what's cost us, in McConnell's words, "potentially valuable intelligence needed to protect America."

What's most interesting in McConnell's op-ed is that he may have found a way to square the circle. Explicitly, he's calling for congress to update FISA -- which mandates court orders for domestic surveillance -- but what he appears to have in mind is for the law to include opt-out clauses for acquiring warrants. For instance:

We simply cannot predict how communications technology will change in the coming years, but these changes may widen the gap between the law and technology. We need to adopt that understanding into FISA -- a law that does not address today's global systems in today's terms.

And:

Just as Congress in 1978 could not have anticipated today's technology, we cannot know how technology will advance in the next 30 years. Our job is to make the country as safe as possible by providing the highest possible quality intelligence available. We should not tie the nation's security to a snapshot of outdated technology.

Prudential warning or invitation to further abuse? McConnell never specifies what he means here, so it's difficult to evaluate the merits of his case. Perhaps he means expanding the 72-hour grace period for after-the-fact court orders in the most crucial surveillance cases. Or he may mean something else entirely. Few would argue that FISA shouldn't keep pace with technological advances. But the solution there is to update FISA as the need arises, which doesn't exactly jibe with McConnell's subtext of creating a law broad enough to cover unanticipated technological progress. We'll see what this means as the FISA debate advances.

UPDATE: Correction appended. Thanks to Glenn Greenwald and Kevin.

Babak Rahimi has a good analysis forthcoming from Jamestown about Moqtada Sadr's outreach to the Sunnis highlighted in this Post piece. To Rahimi, it really is all about seizing internal Shiite control: if Sadr can yield a Sunni-Shiite accord, he'll deliver the security against attack that Shiites desperately want, and he appeals to a Shiite-centric Iraqi identity. His rivals in SIIC and the broader United Iraqi Alliance see themselves marginalized as Iranian proxies, and their Shiite support erodes. (That's why, Rahimi contends, SCIRI changed to SIIC and pledged itself to Grand Ayatollah Sistani.) As an insurance policy, in case it really goes down, Sadr might be able to enlist the support of, say, the Islamic Army of Iraq against the Badr Corps.

It should be said that it's a question of degree whether Sadr is really repositioning himself here. Sadr has always portrayed himself as a voice of Iraqi nationalism and an opponent of sectarianism, even as the Mahdi Army has sourced Sunni elements. The post-Samarra situation saw Sunnis blaming Mahdi forces for practically every attack. Would they accept an olive branch from Sadr now?

Even as Sadr struggles to reform his militia, mistrust runs deep on the streets. Khulood Habib, 45, a Sunni seamstress and mother of four, lives in Baghdad's Risala neighborhood, where tensions are growing after recent bomb attacks on Shiite areas. In the last week of April, gunmen kidnapped two Sunni men near Habib's apartment. The next day, their bodies were found mutilated and tortured -- a signature practice of Shiite militias.

Two days later, Habib received an envelope containing a bullet and a letter signed by the Mahdi Army that ordered her to leave within 24 hours. The next afternoon, gunmen began to drive out the Sunnis in her building. Soon, they were in front of her apartment.

"They broke the door down. It fell on my little boy's leg and broke it," Habib recalled, round-faced with light brown hair peeking from underneath her black head scarf. "He was screaming. I was screaming."

Sadr is said to be cashiering Mahdi commanders who attack Sunnis. If you're a Sunni, you may not be so eager to accept that Sadr wants to be your friend, and if his crew attacks you, he never meant it to be that way. Furthermore, what happens to the fired Mahdi elements? Rahimi argues that it's only a matter of time before they mount a proper challenge to Sadr, further scrambling the Shiite power struggle. If Sunni/al-Qaeda attacks on Shiites continue while Sadr is urging peace, he risks being out-demagogued. Irony is indeed for suckers.

Meanwhile, General Petraeus wrote a letter to Iraqis urging unity, but it remains to be seen if he'll accept a unity of sectarian extremes. If those extremes hold -- even though who knows what agenda a Sadr-IAI-driven coalition would adopt in power -- it would probably yield an acceptable outcome to the United States: an illiberal but united Iraq that doesn't like the U.S. but hates al-Qaeda more.

About 7 p.m., Yglesias and I hear a volley of gunfire. Our crack instincts tell us the shots came from the southeast. Sure enough, they came from the northwest. We rush outside to the porch to see what we can see -- maybe there's been a murder -- and our neighbors come out as well. Suddenly, the neighborhood looks like George Pelecanos would recognize it.

At the liquor store at the southwest corner of Florida and 14th, uniformed cops arrest two thin teenagers, one of whom wears garish sneakers that Yglesias admires. But no one sees any evidence of gunfire: no broken glass, no spiderwebbed windshields, no bodies. That becomes apparent when, up the block at Belmont, at the southern edge of the shopping mall of the damned, police begin taping off a crime scene. We walk over. I catch a cop and display my top-notch reporter skills:

ACKERMAN: Excuse me, officer, can you tell me what happened here?

COP: Can't be giving none of that out.

It's as if I can hear Pelecanos laughing at me, and I deserve it.

No. 611-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 18, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Pfc. Aaron D. Gautier, 19, of Hampton, Va., died May 17 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when his mounted patrol came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire and an improvised explosive device. He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information on this soldier, contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0154 or (253) 967-0147.

Who Schott ya?

Unadulterated perfection.

Christina was like, want to write about this MySpace-ban for Slogger? I was like, definitely.

In other news, watching Yanks-Mets on SNY can make you pine for the wisdom of Michael Kay and Al Leiter.

No. 610-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 18, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Announces Change-In-Status Of Army Soldier

The Department of Defense today announced the death of a soldier supporting Operation Iraq Freedom, who was previously listed as Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN).

Sgt. Anthony J. Schober, 23, of Reno, Nev., died on May 12 in Al Taqa, Iraq, of wounds suffered when his patrol was attacked by enemy forces using automatic fire and explosives. He was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.

For further information contact the Fort Drum public affairs office at (315) 772-8286.

In his press conference yesterday, General James T. Conway, the Marine commandant, repeatedly referred to a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as deleterious for American credibility. Conway declined to spell out exactly how a loss of credibility would endanger America. Rather than let it go, some alert reporter opted to press the commandant:

Q: General, can I ask you -- what you said earlier, you said, we want to come out with as much credibility as the U.S. had when we went in. Could you elaborate on that? What do you mean by credibility? How is U.S. credibility deterred? And is that something that you can tell the American public is worthy of an exchange of your Marines' lives, to maintain that U.S. credibility?

GEN. CONWAY: I don't think that's a fair question or comparison. I will talk about American credibility and say that we are a superpower nation, I think, that stands for some very positive things in this world at this point in time. I think the world would like to see us continue in that role in places outside of Iraq, and I think it's important that it's understood that we are a good partner, we are a good coalition member, and that we will respond when it's in our nation's vital interest. If there's any doubt about that, I think the world is probably a less safe place.

Concede all of Conway's points. There's no reason to believe that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will prompt retrenchment from other places around the globe. Camp Bondsteel will not close up shop if FOB Justice does. Bagram Airbase certainly won't. The U.S. will still be a superpower if it leaves Iraq in one year or ten years. Credibility is a less useful concept here than capability -- what the U.S. will be able to do in the event of a challenge to its power -- and Iraq saps U.S. military capability severely, with little in the way of offsetting benefit. Following Conway's reasoning, that makes the world a more dangerous place. None of this is to say that there won't be consequences to a withdrawal from Iraq, but American superpower status won't be a casualty of the war.

Jonah Goldberg objects to a cheap equivalence between Republicans and fascists. Yes, that Jonah Goldberg. His post contains this delicious line:

But do note the hilarious irony and lack of self-awareness here.

Do!

Michael Gerson and Tony Blair, Gladstonians against the Horde:

In our conversation, Blair would not be drawn into second-guessing on failures in early stages of the Iraq war -- troop levels, de-Baathification and the like. Those debates, while "perfectly legitimate," do not account for decisive factors beyond the control of the coalition, particularly the bombing campaign of al-Qaeda and Iran's strategy of "containing America" by seeking to "bog them down in Iraq."

"If those two external elements were not there, this thing would be very nearly manageable," Blair told me. "Sometimes you have to come to a very simple conclusion, which is that your enemies decided to fight you."

This is an exculpation? That al-Qaeda would make use of the U.S.'s position of occupying an Arab (mostly) country? Or that Iran would seek to turn its encirclement by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to its advantage? And that the U.S. would find those two developments to be nearly insurmountable amid the other rigors of occupying Iraq? Even if Gerson's infatuation with a morality of intentions can't penetrate the veneer of what's happened in Iraq, Blair should know that a foreign policy that invites a "decisive" response from its adversaries can't possibly survive. And if the point of it all is to nurture human rights while protecting one's interests, then neither objective is served by its collapse.

Attention, readers with medical expertise or a history of overcoming back pain: what should Catherine do about her suddenly uncooperative spine? In other Flophauser news, it's Matt's 26th birthday, Kriston takes the knives out for Jed Perl, Becks should be gracing us with her presence later today, and those of you in northeastern Utah can hear me on the NPR affiliate KPCW at 9 a.m. local time talking about The Iraq.

No. 606-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 17, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Thomas G. Wright, 38, of Holly, Mich., died May 14 enroute to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Landstuhl, Germany, from a non-combat related illness while serving at Balad, Iraq.Wright was assigned to the 46th Military Police Company, 210th Military Police Battalion, Kingsford, Mich.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Michigan Army National Guard public affairs office at (517) 481-8140.

No. 607-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 17, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 14 in Salman Pak, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their unit came in contact with enemy forces using an improvised explosive device and small arms fire.They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.

Killed were:

Sgt. Allen J. Dunckley, 25, of Yardley, Pa.

Sgt. Christopher N. Gonzalez, 25, of Winslow, Ariz.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Stewart public affairs office at (912) 767-2479.

No. 602-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 16, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Marine Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lance Cpl. Jeffrey D. Walker, 21, of Macon, Ga., died May 14 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. He was assigned to Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Media with questions about this Marine can contact the 2nd Marine Logistics Group Public Affairs Office at (910) 451-3538.

It hasn't even been a month since Washington started salivating for General Petraeus's September report on the surge's success or failure, and sure enough, Petraeus has to take a bib to everyone's mouth. From his interview with Jane Arraf for IraqSlogger:

“Clearly they have to show that they are willing to reconcile and that they can make some progress in some legislative areas to give hope to some of the people there that perhaps could put some time on the Washington clock...Come September, I don’t think we’ll have anything definitive in September (although) certainly we’ll have some indicators on the political side in Iraq.”

Now, about that reconciliation. If the surge hasn't come completely unmoored from its original purpose, it exists to support the creation of a centripetal political force in Baghdad. Petraeus, chief architect of the new counterinsurgency manual, would be out of character if he separated his assessment of political progress from that of his military efforts. So if he and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are prepping to assess the state of Iraqi cohesion, then the September report ought to focus on whether the surge has been overtaken by the increasingly calamitous politics of Iraq. NPR, via Ann:

In Parliament last week, Shiite lawmaker Shatha al-Mousawi was complaining bitterly about her recent visit with displaced Shiites from Diyala province. They were expelled from their homes because of sectarian violence.

It's intolerable that the government allows this bloodshed to happen, she said, demanding that the prime minister and other top officials be summoned to Parliament to respond.

The speaker of Parliament reacted to her emotional diatribe with laughter.

Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, a Sunni, said he was laughing to conceal his pain at the situation in which the Shiites of Diyala found themselves. But Shiite parliamentarians openly scolded him for his seemingly coldhearted reaction, and he in turn began attacking them.

"Three-quarters of those sitting here are responsible for the displacements and the sectarian killings, and now you're calling yourselves patriots?" he thundered.

Iraqi politics will never be "over." There is no discernible point at which a sectarian war will become "full-fledged." Petraeus and Crocker need to make judgment calls on when the situation defies American remedy. That really ought to be visible by September.

No. 599-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 16, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Pfc. Zachary R. Gullett, 20, of Hillsboro, Ohio, died May 1 in Baghdad, Iraq, as a result of a non-combat related incident.His death is under investigation.

Gullett was assigned to the 984th Military Police Company, 759th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Carson, Colo.For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Carson public affairs office at (719) 526-3420; after hours (719) 526-5500.

Interesting note in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal transcript of Majid Khan (PDF), who's accused of being an associate of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's and likely asset for a post-9/11 attack inside the U.S.:

If I was so anti-American, why would I help the FBI catch an illegal Pakistani immigrant named "SHAFEEQ" in the mid of 2002. Certainly al-Qaida lovers would rather die than do what I did.

After catching SHAFEEQ, the FBI called me to thank, to say thank you for your assistance.

Verification or refutation of this from the FBI would be something the tribunal could easily obtain. If true, it wouldn't be dispositive of Khan's terrorist connections, but it would merit some serious explanation for why a KSM associate would cooperate with the FBI.

SCIRI, as noted, is now the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, or SIIC. I know I already suggested calling it "Psych," but maybe we should call it the Supreme Team instead. It won't be long before Iraqis are rapping about the SIIC-vs-police-vs.-Sadr wars.

Dave Kilcullen, COIN expert and Petraeus brain-truster, is engaged in a fascinating debate over religion and counterinsurgency on the Small Wars Journal blog. Kilcullen's basic contention is that religion provides only superficial motivation for insurgency; Bing West rejoinders here. Among the most intriguing aspects of Kilcullen's argument -- made in comments to West's reply -- is that not all Salafists are "irreconciliables":

But in point of fact many countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia) have had considerable success in de-radicalization and de-programming this type of extremist. So it may be that hearts and minds requires a significantly different approach from the “bread and circuses” style of the 1960s, but it still seems to work if done right. Treating these people as irredeemable just encourages them to fight to the death. Like any other human being, they respond to a psychological "out" with weakened resolve.

More traditional approaches would prioritize separating the Salafists from a vulnerable population before indoctrination sets in. Kilcullen doesn't quite go this far in his post, but his argument suggests that a viable approach would be to understand, identify and isolate the less-committed members within a given Salafist organization, who would be vulnerable to de-radicalization. It's controversial, but it's also fairly intuitive: every identity-based organization exhibits varying degrees of commitment among its membership.

If this reads Kilcullen correctly, the argument holds that a counterinsurgent strategist doesn't have to cede, say, al-Qaeda its existing adherents. This would run into the problem of identifying who the weak links are, and crafting strategies of deprogramming. Neither of which are trivial concerns -- in fact, they're significant-enough challenges as to raise the question of whether such a strategy is resource-effective, and hence whether it's better to isolate the extant al-Q cohort from further potential recruits. But, man, what a bracing idea.

McCain merely flirted with the idea of taking executive "responsibility" for torturing terrorism detainees. (Sorry, for applying "enhanced interrogation techniques.") Mitt Romney pledged to do so outright, as did Tom Tancredo and I think Duncan Hunter. It's worth thinking this through.

It seems something of a corruption of Michael Walzer's "dirty hands" argument, which, applied to torture, stipulates that if, under extraordinary circumstances, a president must break the law, he or she is obligated to -- after the crisis passes -- publicly acknowledge the lawbreaking and submit to the mercy of the judicial system. Does anyone think for a second this would happen? Just today, James Comey testified that in 2004, as acting attorney general, he refused to reauthorize the warrantless surveillance program on grounds of illegality, but President Bush personally overrode the de-authorization. No one learned of the program until the New York Times disclosed it. Only today did Comey publicly confirm the incident, which is an unambiguous case of a president deciding his prerogative outweighs the law.

This is a much more likely template for future presidential action than the "dirty hands" case. Now that Bush has established the reprisal-free precedent that national-security emergencies allow a president to dispense with the law, his successor possesses little incentive to even acknowledge such excesses, and practically none to voluntarily accept adjudication or punishment. President X would expose him/herself as an angel, inadvertently weakening the value of the rule of law simply by example of his/her virtue, which refutes the need for the law in the first place. If Romney et al believes there are circumstances that demand torture, he needs to propose changing the law to allow for those cases, and see if the country accepts the contention. That -- rather than wrapping illegality in cloak of declaratory virtue, or debasing virtue by conflation with illegality -- would be "taking responsibility."

No. 592-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 590-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 15, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of three soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 12 in Al Taqa, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their patrol was attacked by enemy forces using automatic fire and explosives.They were assigned to the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y.

Killed were:

Sgt. 1st Class James D. Connell Jr., 40, of Lake City, Tenn.

Pfc. Daniel W. Courneya, 19, of Nashville, Mich.

Pfc. Christopher E. Murphy, 21, of Lynchburg, Va.

For further information related to this release, contact the Fort Drum public affairs office at (315) 772-8286.

No. 589-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 15, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Air Force Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of an airman who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Staff Sgt. John T. Self, 29, of Pontotoc, Miss., died May 14 as result of enemy action near Baghdad, Iraq.He was assigned to the 314th Security Forces Squadron, Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Little Rock AFB public affairs office at (501) 987-3601.

Tom Tancredo: If we go down, western civilization goes down.

The plays of Aristophenes. Gone. The theories of Liebniz. Gone. The souffle. Gone. All it takes is one craven politician's unwillingness to waterboard someone.

I come back from Annapolis and Capps has the second GOP debate on, right in time to hear Ron Paul assert that U.S. hegemony in the Middle East gave rise to 9/11. Rather than rebut Paul, Rudy Giuliani appears sincerely furious at the contention, and immediately implies that Paul argued the U.S. deserved to be attacked. Paul stumbles through a response. Giuliani earns a raucous round of applause. Mitt Romney attempts to jump in and steal Giuliani's thunder, but he's cut off. Later on, Tom Tancredo jumps back in and disagrees with Ron Paul because Islam demands blowing up Sheboygen.

Then John McCain repanders on the Confederate flag! After the audience boos a moderator's reference to McCain's admission of cowardice in 2000 over calling the flag a "state issue" for South Carolina, McCain draws the ludicrous distinction that because now the flag isn't flying "on top of the State House," there's no problem at all with displaying the flag. He pleas for everyone to move on. Mark Salter immediately drafts a few scratch sentences for McCain's forthcoming memoir about how that was the most shameless thing he could have said in his failed 2008 bid.

Practically tasting the bile of disgrace rising in his throat, McCain recovers by refusing to torture a terrorist in a hypothetical ticking bomb case laid out by Brit Hume. Or at least I think he did. He prefaces his answer by saying the responsibility for the decision is his and his alone -- which suggests Michael Walzer's contention that the president can morally, in such cases, break the law, provided he recognize that he is breaking it and subsequently throw himself on the mercy of the legal system. But rather than spell out what he means, McCain pivots to a forthright denunciation of torture, complete with an explicit rejection of the consequentialist case: "We could never gain as much from that torture as we'd lose in world opinion." OK, clearly, McCain is still against torture.

Giuliani on waterboarding: "I would tell the people doing the interrogation to use every method they can think of. It shouldn't be torture, but every method they could think of." Waterboarding? asks Brit Hume. "Every method they can think of, and I would support them in doing that, because I've seen, I have seen what --" Massive applause. "--what can happen when you make a mistake about this." If it needs to be pointed out, 9/11 did not succeed because of a U.S. aversion to waterboarding. Trying to make up for his earlier denied pander, Mitt Romney endorses "doubling Guantanamo," whatever that means.

Winner: Giuliani. His bloodlust gets the audience's blood up.

(UPDATE: Loser: Ackerman's command of grammar and syntax. Post has been updated to reflect greater fealty to the English language.)

Tony Snow uses a truly unfortunate turn of phrase over the fate of Paul Wolfowitz. The White House will not negotiate with international finance bureaucracies!

Only after the charges against Wolfowitz are resolved, he said, would it then be appropriate to consider the bank's leadership going forward.

"Separately, at some point in the future there are going to be conversations about the proper stewardship of the World Bank," Snow said. "In that sense ... all options are on the table," Snow said.

The D.C. National Guard has been federalized and will begin its march down H Street after a brief missile volley.

Right, about expectations management. There's not actually a lot to argue about with Matt over Hot Fuzz, since we agree that it's both a fun movie and inferior to Shaun of the Dead. But in the interest of colliding hardest over the least yardage: yes, it is indeed a disappointing film. I plead guilty to not managing my expectations, but if you've seen the stuff that the Hot Fuzz team have produced to date, you would be overeager yourself. Some spoilers follow -- go see the movie instead, really! -- but here goes.

The last half-hour of Hot Fuzz is a thing of beauty, replete with everything that makes Edgar Wright such a brilliant director of satire. But if you've seen Spaced, the Simon Pegg-Edgar Wright sitcom, the big jokes are really familiar. "Jumping in the air going 'Agh'" is funny. But it's a step down from the sublime absurdity of the episode of Spaced where Tim and Daisy have to escape their Chav persecutors through a mock-gunfight. I thought making that mock-gunfight a literal gunfight, and giving it a budget, would make that gag even better, as Pegg and Wright evidently did. And it's funny! But it's not funnier.

It's also hard to ignore how broad the turns are in the film, and not in a good comedic way. Unveiling Danny Butterman's DVD collection made for a good scene, but... it didn't have any impact on Nick Angel, even though the scene bills itself as a turning point for Nick. Timothy Dalton is great in Hot Fuzz, so great that his performance demands a better vehicle than the one his character actually provides. He starts off as the villain, then appears to be a red herring -- no, wait, he is the villain, never mind. Now, in Spaced and in Shaun, the big joke is that no character can recognize his or her role in a very obvious satire, but that same tone of obliviousness can't be struck when your sidekick relentlessly jawbones about Bad Boys II, and yet, there's earnest Nick. Same goes for the back-and-forth with the hotel manager or the unveiling of the coven. It works well enough when the audience is in on the satire, but not when there's reason to suspect that the main character -- or at least his sidekick -- should be as well.

None of this is to say that Hot Fuzz is bad. It's not. But it could have done with another draft or two of revisions, as Pegg, Wright and Nick Frost are capable of some amazing stuff. BitTorrent yourself the twelve episodes of Spaced and all will become clear.

Today's the deadline set by the Sunni Accordance Front to walk out of the political process, and it looks like the Accordance Front's Tariq Hashemi was bluffing. He didn't get the changes to the constitution he blustered towards. Instead, he got instead some nebulous "executive" position over security. The early report, from the AP:

Under the terms, Al Hashemi will have an 'executive role' in the fight against insurgents in Sunni areas inside and outside the capital, the lawmakers said.

Given that Maliki's office (1) purges anti-death squad national police and army commanders and (2) commands its own expanding Shiite intelligence apparatus, Hashemi most likely got hosed here. It's natural that he should be the one to back down on the constitution: his Iraqi Islamic Party was the only Sunni organization to support it back in late 2005 -- and then only so it could be revised later on. Now, so much for that.

Also, today is the deadline for the constitution committee to unveil proposed revisions. So far -- as expected -- nothing.

UPDATE: Reuters says the committee agreed to present the revisions to parliament next Tuesday, although federalism isn't going to be on the table. Hashemi says there'll be a relaxation of de-Baathification coming soon to parliament as well -- jointly drafted by him, Jalal Talabani, and Adel Abdul Mehdi. Those last two are hardcore advocates of de-Baathification, so God only knows what the three of them can agree on.

No. 588-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 15, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Rhys W. Klasno, 20, of Riverside, Calif., died May 13 in Haditha, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Klasno was assigned to the 1114th Transportation Company, Bakersfield, Calif.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the California National Guard public affairs office at (916) 854-3829.

Leila Feidel of McClatchy is doing work in this piece about insecurity within the Green Zone:

Embassy employees have been ordered not to talk about security concerns or precautions with reporters, but three State Department employees in Baghdad discussed the issue with McClatchy Newspapers. All three asked not to be identified for fear that they'd lose their jobs.

The officials also complained that important security precautions appeared to have been set aside during highly publicized official visits. During a March 31 visit from Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., a high-profile presidential candidate, the embassy lifted a requirement that bulletproof vests and helmets be worn at all times. When a rocket landed outside the U.S. Embassy while Vice President Dick Cheney and several reporters visited last week, no warning sirens were sounded.

"Where were the sirens then?" one official asked. "We don't belong here, and people are afraid to say it."

It's hard to overstate the psychological effect of the Green Zone as an oasis, where you can walk around without body armor, lingering in the courtyard of a hotel or reading a book on a bench near Ocean Cliffs. To lose that is to be in a state of permanent siege. Good to know that the only reason the siege is lifted is because John McCain needs some quality b-roll.

No. 584-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 14, 2007
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DoD Identfies Marine Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Maj. Douglas A. Zembiec, 34, of Albuquerque, N.M., died May 11 while conducting combat operations in Baghdad, Iraq. He was assigned to Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps National Capital Region, Henderson Hall, Arlington, Va.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the headquarters Marine Corps public affairs office at (703) 614-4309.

No. 583-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

1st Lt. Andrew J. Bacevich, 27, of Walpole, Mass., died May 13 in Balad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his unit during combat patrol operations in Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq.He was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

OK, so the rebranded SCIRI is now SIIC. If you want a thorough discussion, see Eric "I Pwned THFTNR" Martin. If you want flippancy, I suggest we pronounce the new acronym like"psych." ("We're not in bed with the Iranians anymore! SIIC!")

If the dominant U.S. interest in Iraq is the suppression of al-Qaeda, Harith al-Dari's denunciation of the Qaeda-sponsored Islamic State of Iraq to Bobby Ghosh of Time is profoundly important. al-Dari, the leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, a premier locus of Sunni rejectionism, is one of the most important men in Iraq. The ISI should have never capped his nephew. Earlier this month, al-Dari called on bin Laden himself to reconcile the ISI with anti-al-Qaeda Sunnis, and bitterly denounced U.S.-complicit anti-al Qaeda Sunnis like Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi. Since the killing of Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq has almost systematically dismantled its connections with the Sunni insurgency out of a desire to control it -- and this is despite putting ever more of an Iraqi face on its operations. The evidence just keeps accumulating that al-Qaeda can miscalculate even worse than the United States, which gives the U.S. a chance to mitigate the Iraq misadventure somewhat.

But.

Increasingly, it's possible to classify the Sunnis in Anbar and elsewhere into two categories, which are admittedly reductionist and imprecise: U.S.-complicit, anti-al Qaeda Sunnis, like these guys profiled by Eli today; and anti-U.S. anti-Maliki anti-al Qaeda insurgents, like the "Reform and Jihad Front" (via Abu Aardvark). al-Dari clearly falls in the latter category. At some point these two groups are going to vie for power, if they're not already: al-Dari and the RJF reject al-Q in part for its usurpation of resistance against the U.S., so there's little reason to believe they can peacefully coexist with men like al-Rishawi, whom they view as a collaborator. And all things being equal, the U.S. should side with those willing to side with it against those who'd prefer to kill U.S. troops and civilians.

But what if the RJF faction is stronger than the al-Rishawi/Anbar Salvation Council faction? In other words, what if the destruction of al-Q is more than al-Rishawi can provide? I won't pretend to be able to adjudicate the relative strengths of each movement, but it at least seems likely that the latter faction is the one with more ex-Baathist military officials in it, which speaks to its relative competence as a force. If that is indeed the way it shakes out, then the U.S. will need to find a modus vivendi with people who clearly will never accept Shiite rule. al-Dari:

Al-Dari also remains inflexible in his hatred of the al-Maliki government, which he accuses of "serving foreign masters" — a reference to the close ties of leading Shi'ite politicians to Iran.

The RJF:

The RJF’s goals are to “fight all kind of occupations” (that is, American and Iranian) and to “make Iraq an Islamic State and guarantee its unity under an Islamic flag.” The RJF has also vowed to “target occupation forces and their agents and not civilians” to “promote moderate Islam and denounce all parties which do not differentiate between good and evil” to “abolish all decisions adopted by the American government including de-Baathification” and “to work to release all prisoners.” The RJF announced that they will never recognize the al-Maliki government and that upon taking power they will abolish the current constitution.

If al-Rishawi can deliver on everything he says -- dismantling al-Qaeda in Iraq, giving Maliki at least a listen -- then the point is moot. But if not, then the U.S. will find itself needing to choose between which of its reduced-tier goal for Iraq is the imperative: to deny al-Qaeda a base of operations or to foster an Iraqi state. Add into the mix that there's a significant propaganda value to pointing to a credible insurgent operation that hates the U.S. and still rejects al-Qaeda -- and rejects them violent and successfully.

No. 580-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Ali Soufan was the FBI agent who administered the al-Qaeda oath of loyalty to Rafiq Sabir and his (alleged) would-be accomplices in the Bronx. You might recall Soufan from Lawrence Wright's book The Looming Tower, which recounts Soufan's investigation of the U.S.S. Cole bombing and then his pre-9/11 hunt for al-Q in the United States. It's remarkable that Soufan's high profile doesn't interfere with his effectiveness as an agent.

UPDATE: See Eric from TIA in comments. I believe the word is "pwnage."

No. 578-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 14, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Michael K. Frank, 36, of Great Falls, Mont., died of injuries suffered in Baghdad May 10, when an improvised explosive device detonated near his HMMWV during combat operations.He was assigned to the 1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.

For more information on this soldier, contact the 82nd Airborne Division public affairs office at (910) 432-0661.

What's going on with the recent violence in northern Iraq? Escalating tensions over a controversial referendum, for one thing. My latest Comment Is Free post is here, and includes some reporting from Nineweh Province.

Sgt. Jason W. Vaughn, 29, of Iuka, Miss., died May 10 in Baqubah, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Vaughn was assigned to the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0154 or (253) 967-0147.

No. 573-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 11, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties


The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 8 in Salman Pak, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle.

Killed were:

Sgt. Blake C. Stephens, 25, of Pocatello, Idaho.

Spc. Kyle A. Little, 20, of West Boylston, Mass.

Both soldiers were assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Ga.For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Benning public affairs office at (706) 545-3512; after hours, call (706) 545-2218.

No. 572-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 11, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Maj. Bradly D. Conner, 41, of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, died May 9 near Al-Hillah, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improved explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Conner was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the U.S. Army Special Operations Command public affairs office at (910) 432-6005.

No. 567-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 10, 2007
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DoD Identifies Marine Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lance Cpl. Walter K. O'Haire, 20, of Lynn, Mass., died May 9 from wounds suffered while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq. O'Haire was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the II Marine Expeditionary Force public affairs office at (910) 451-7200.

No. 564-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 10, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Dan H. Nguyen, 24, of Sugar Land, Texas, died May 8 in Tahrir, Iraq, when his unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire.He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

Back away from September, says a spokeswoman for General Odierno. Robert Burns reports:

(Lt. Col. Josslyn) Aberle said in a telephone interview that Odierno believes September is too soon to expect to have a complete view of whether the U.S. strategy is viable.

"Is three months an adequate amount of time to show a true picture?" Aberle said.

Newness on Iraq for TAP Online. Contra Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, there's some outta control sectarianism happening. Also, I blame Alex Chilton for the headline, since nothing from "September Gurls" was really Iraq-appropriate.

No. 560-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 09, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of six Soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died May 6 in Baqubah, Iraq, of wounds sustained when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle during combat operations. They were assigned to the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Vincenzo Romeo, 23, of Lodi, N.J.

Sgt. Jason R. Harkins, 25, of Clarkesville, Ga.

Sgt. Joel W. Lewis, 28, of Sandia Park, N.M.

Cpl. Matthew L. Alexander, 21, of Gretna, Neb.

Cpl. Anthony M. Bradshaw, 21, of San Antonio, Texas.

Cpl. Michael A. Pursel, 19, of Clinton, Utah.

For further information on these Soldiers, contact the Fort Lewis public affairs office at (253) 967-0154 or (253) 967-0147.

No. 558-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Oh, snap, Maliki! Says Dick Cheney's spokesman: "It's game time." Your intransigence and sectarianism have now officially entered their last throes!

No. 555-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 09, 2007
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DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Spc. Robert J. Dixon, 27, of Minneapolis, died May 6 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Dixon was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Riley public affairs office at (785) 239-3410.

This Times piece has Tariq al-Hashemi aflutter over his face time with Maliki. The Sunni Accordance Front has threatened to walk out of the political process if the year-overdue constitutional amendments don't move forward, and chances are they will indeed go for a vote.

But look at how the fix is in for actually changing the constitution, as opposed to merely moving a bill forward. Via IraqSlogger-translating-Aswat al-Iraq, a member of the constitution committee raises the curtain:

Ti'ma explained that any decision in the Parliament will take all the amendments as a package in one up-or-down vote, rather than voting on each individual amendment.

If the Parliament approves the amendments, they will be submitted to a popular referendum for final approval.

A two-step impediment. If omnibus voting doesn't call together a coalition of people objecting to various proposals, the referendum will repeat the sectarian bloc-vote that guaranteed passage of a Shiite and Kurdish constitution in October 2005. Once again, rejection is guaranteed by "two third of the voters in three governorates or more," a very easy standard to meet in the Shiite south. Bitter harvest, indeed.

Yeah, he's my friend, and yeah, he's a neocon, but goddamn is this ever a magnificent piece of journalism.

Is Condoleezza Rice floating the idea of bilateral cooperation with Bashar Assad to close the Iraqi-Syrian border? Christina Davidson is noticing things.

Anti-war GOP Congressman Wayne Gilchrest tells Dave Weigel that John McCain is a delicate velveteen rabbit!

Reason: You're a veteran and Johnson and McCain are veterans. Why did you take such a different lesson from Vietnam?

WG: I respect both of those guys. But they flew airplanes. They were in prison camps. They weren't on the ground, fighting with the South Vietnamese army, or on the ground every day in 120 degree heat, or in driving rainstorms day after day after day, in the swamps, in the rivers, in the jungles. I respect them immensely but they have different perspective from someone who saw combat on the ground. Both those poor souls were tortured. My view is that of a grunt. I'm not talking "cut and run," not "the war is lost," not "we can't win," I'm not saying that. I'm saying we need a change in policy where we're fighting the terrorists.

As a member of McCainSpace, I vow to follow Wayne Gilchrest to the gates of hell.

UPDATE: Yeah, I misspelled the guy's name.

Mike Scheuer catches Ayman Zawahiri posing as a friend of the black man on his latest mixtape:

Al-Zawahiri told American Muslims that Malcolm X drew these "powerful concepts" from Islam, and that they are as applicable today to the oppressed condition of black American Muslims as they were in his lifetime. Al-Qaeda's deputy said to African American Muslims that "I hope no one replies to me that blacks in America have been delivered from its tyranny because there are the likes of Colin Powell—the liar of the Security Council—and Condoleezza Rice in power." Using what he claimed was al-Shabaaz's analysis, al-Zawahiri identified Powell and Rice as "house slaves," African Americans who prospered because they were obedient and helpful to their masters.

And then at the end of the tape, he stared into the camera and shouted "I am Malcolm X!" This might be the least persuasive appeal to radicalize American Muslims ever. Clearly Zawahiri hasn't seen the Blackface Blog Chart. Scheuer speculates that Zawahiri might have had help in crafting his pitch from Azzam the American, a/k/a Death Metal Adam, since this is the sort of message to black people that only a white boy could come up with.

Ah, to serve as a line cook on a pirate crew -- a romantic temptation, but one set for ruin thanks to massive, inescapable debt. This is why Punk Rock Kitchen remains uneducated.

Everyone check out the fresh-and-brand-new American Prospect website, oiled with the blood, sweat and tears of Sam Rosenfeld and Ann Friedman, otherwise known as the Awesome Two. Should you be so inclined, you can read something about George Tenet from someone or other.

No. 542-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 07, 2007
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DoD Identifies Marine Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two Marines who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died May 5 while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar province, Iraq.

Master Sgt. Kenneth N. Mack, 42, of Fort Worth, Texas.

Cpl. Charles O. Palmer II, 36, of Manteca, Calif.

Mack was assigned to II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquaters Group, II MEF, Camp Lejeune, N.C.Palmer was assigned to 8th Communication Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group, II MEF, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the II Marine Expeditionary Force public affairs office at (910) 451-7200.

No. 544-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 07, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near their vehicle during combat operations May 4 in Baghdad, Iraq.They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

Killed were:

Staff Sgt. Christopher N. Hamlin, 24, of London, Ky., died May 4 in Baghdad, Iraq.

Pfc. Larry I. Guyton, 22, of Brenham, Texas, died May 5 in Balad, Iraq.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

No. 541-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 07, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Pfc. Jerome J. Potter, 24, of Tacoma, Wash., died May 3 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.Potter was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

No. 536-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 05, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 3 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire.

Killed were:

Sgt. Felix G. Gonzalez-Iraheta, 25, of Sun Valley, Calif.

Pfc. John D. Flores, 21, of Barrigada, Guam.

Both were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany.For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the 1st Armored Division public affairs office at 011-49-611-705-4859.

No. 538-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 05, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom. They died May 3 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, of wounds sustained when their armored personnel carrier was struck by an improvised explosive device. They were assigned to Company B, 321st Engineer Battalion of the U.S. Army Reserve, Hayden Lake, Idaho.


Killed were:


Staff Sgt. Coby G. Schwab, 25, of Puyallup, Wash.


Spc. Kelly B. Grothe, 21, of Spokane, Wash.


For additional information on these soldiers, contact the Army Reserve 70th Regional Readiness Command public affairs office at (206) 281-3026.

Ah, for the days when the oil law was a reconciliation measure. Now, it's looking more like a prison-yard shanking. The Kurdistan Regional Government pressed the fight against the law yesterday in an unexpected manner: calling an advocate of centralization a racist.

Issam al-Chalabi was Iraq's oil minister from 1987 to 1990. He now lives in Amman as an oil-industry analyst, and he's been a critic of the law for not granting the Iraqi National Oil Company enough control. (The Kurds oppose the law for giving INOC too much control.) Recently, he sent colleagues a rather innocuous e-mail describing Kurdish objections to the draft and concluding that, accordingly, "this brings back the whole issue to square one." Someone then put the e-mail on the internet with the subject heading "Back to square one, Kaka! ... have some oil..."

"Kaka" is apparently a racial slur against the Kurds during Saddam's time. It's analogous to a white man calling a black man "boy." The Kurdish oil minister released a statement saying:

The KRG regrets that this language is still in circulation amongst some Iraqis. We understand that Mr. Al-Chalabi has a point of view on the oil law which he has a right to express, but the publication of this point of view with a racist slur is not acceptable. We call on Mr. Issam Al-Chalabi to clarify the circumstances of the publication of his email. We call on Mr. Issam Al-Chalabi and his colleagues to reconcile themselves to a new Iraq in which all ethnicities and sects have equal protection under federal and regional law and are deserving of equal respect.

A great slight of hand here. Ashti Hawrami, the Kurdish minister, isn't directly accusing Chalabi of using the slur himself, but Hawrami goes even further by associating centralization with anti-Kurdish racism. Smell the reconciliation.

No. 533-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 04, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
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DoD Identifies Marine Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Marine who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Lance Cpl. Johnathan E. Kirk, 25, of Belhaven, N.C., died May 1 from wounds received while conducting combat operations on April 23 in Al Anbar province, Iraq. Kirk was assigned to 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Camp Lejeune Public Affairs Office at (910) 451-7440.

No. 531-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 04, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

1st Lt. Colby J. Umbrell, 26, of Doylestown, Pa., died May 3 in Musayyib, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle.He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the U.S. Army, Alaska, public affairs office at (907) 384-1542.

No wonder Condoleezza Rice warned of "overreaching expectations" for the Sharm el-Sheikh conference. Not only is the Sunni Accordance Front is threatening to abandon the political process, but Sunni leaders are pushing a message of total opposition to Maliki in Egypt. Slogger:

The official spokesman for the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq Sheikh Mohammed Bashar Al-Faidhi described the Iraq conference at Sharm Al-Sheikh as a “failure,” as he warned Iraqis not to expect any positive results from it. “This is the final attempt by the international community and the occupation to support the current government, which is guilty of crimes against the Iraqi people,” said Al-Faidhi, adding that the five-year “International Compact” plan adopted overwhelmingly in the conference is an attempt to save the government, not the Iraqi people. “If there was a sincere intention to save Iraq from its predicament, they should have invited Iraqi political opposition groups and the resistance for a dialogue,” he said.

Not entirely unlike the last regional reconciliation conference, then. That time around, the effort was to bring the Sunnis into the political process, something the Sunnis accepted when they saw the efforts of the Kurds and Shiites to push through their visions of Iraq unobstructed. Now, the Accordance Front -- the larger of the two Sunni parliamentary blocs -- sees politics as insufficiently obstructionist to the Shiites. Recall that most of the parties represented in the Accordance Front were the only Sunnis that didn't boycott the Maliki-led December 2006 reconciliation conference. Sunni opposition to Maliki is now at a high point inside and outside of Iraq precisely when he and the U.S. are trying to convince the region he's a national leader.

It's true that the bloc has made this threat a few times over the last few weeks without following through. At the same time, the more significant fact is that the political process is showing greater fatigue, not less, during the troop surge, which, remember, is supposed to bolster reconciliation. Concede General Petraeus's point that sectarian killings in Baghdad are a third of what they were in January: clearly the statistic is less persuasive to Iraqi Sunnis than it is to Americans. It makes little sense to expect more of the surge to advance a political dynamic whose fractures are deepening despite the surge's successes.

More fundamentally: the Sunni push against Maliki is a push against Shiite control. How the process anoints another Shiite leader -- Adel Abdul Mehdi? -- without repeating the experience of the Maliki government is difficult to understand, but elevating a non-Shiite leader given the Shiite majority in Iraq is unthinkable.

Behold! Mitt Romney rides a pale horse. From last night's debate:

But I don't want to buy into the Democratic pitch, that this is all about one person, Osama bin Laden. Because after we get him, there's going to be another and another.

Bin Laden is a singular figure, but, you know, fair enough; there will be a successor to bin Laden. But where might Romney be going with this?

This is about Shi'a and Sunni. This is about Hezbollah and Hamas and al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is the worldwide jihadist effort to try and cause the collapse of all moderate Islamic governments and replace them with a caliphate.

Mitt Romney's War: the total conflation of all Islamist movements. Not only is the Muslim Brotherhood not a jihadist organization, but its very lack of jihadiness is what spawned Ayman Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Suffice it to say that there is no caliphate on heaven or earth that will simultaneously satisfy Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, which goes a long way toward explaining why there is no concerted "worldwide jihadist effort" by these groups to establish one.

It's hardly remarkable that Romney doesn't know what he's talking about. In this year's State of the Union, Bush forced the same conflation when he stated baldly, "The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat." What's far more troublesome is that there's absolutely no political consequence for demonstrated ignorance about a jihadist phenomenon that motivates the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq -- precisely the sort of ignorance that will make the blithe forecasts of a global war expanding over generations a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Perversely, the expanding concept of a global war on all currents of Islamism makes the U.S. appear so much weaker than we are and our enemies so much stronger than they could hope to portray themselves. (What if someone proclaimed a caliphate and everyone rebelled?) Leave it to Bush and Romney to find political utility in a paranoid American declinism.

No. 528-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 04, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died May 2 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their vehicle struck an improvised explosive device.They were assigned to the 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan.

Killed were:

1st Lt. Ryan P. Jones, 23, of Massachusetts.

Spc. Astor A. Sunsin-Pineda, 20, of Long Beach, Calif.

For further information on these soldiers, contact the Fort Riley public affairs office at (785) 239-3410.

No. 527-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 03, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Pfc. Katie M. Soenksen, 19, of Davenport, Iowa, died May 2 in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when an improvised explosive device detonated near her vehicle.She was assigned to the 410th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Hood public affairs office at (254) 287-9993; after hours (254) 291-2591.

Why might Sunnis feel that security concerns are weighted against them? Eli Lake reports that the Iraqi Army is targeting only Sunnis, leaving the U.S. to fight the Mahdi Army. An adviser to the Baghdad Operations Command, Major Michael Philipak, explains that while the sectarian imbalance in targeting is troublesome, it boils down to an issue of intelligence collection:

"The intelligence agencies who are developing the targets … are Shia," the major said. "We have not detected they are sectarian or have an ulterior motive. Their sources generating the intelligence tend to be Shia, and they have a great deal of fear that targeting Shia militias will get them killed."

Perhaps, but -- as Eli points out -- Iraq has overlapping intelligence services, one controlled by the Shiites and the other controlled by the CIA and run by a Sunni ex-general named Muhammed Shahwani. As long as both exist, pressure will exist on each to embrace a stance of greater sectarianism as a check on the other's excesses.

Then there's the question of leaving the U.S. in the lead of going after the Mahdi Army. It's hard to know what Maliki's stance is here. It could be that he's forced into the position of directing or acquiescing to greater Sunni targeting as a way of mollifying his fellow Shiites. Or it could be that he's trying to distance himself from his own U.S.-dependent security plan. Alternatively, and somewhat less plausibly, he could know nothing about the operation. In any case, Maliki's relationship with the Sunnis is eroding rapidly. Sharm el-Sheikh should be a lot of fun.

Sure enough, the Kurds and Sunnis oppose the oil law. The Times quotes Jalaleddin Saghir saying the Kurds are merely staking out a bargaining position, but if the Kurds won't be able to control the revenue from future-field development, they simply won't accept the deal. By contrast, if the Sunni objection is that Maliki has to magically provide security for them before they'll accept movement on the oil law, then they're really out to cripple Maliki's government. Keep in mind the Sunnis are the very people the law is meant to mollify.

Perhaps this is all pre-negotiating bluster. But the idea that the passage of a law can overcome the massive amount of sectarian bad faith in Iraq is a dicey proposition. Consider this critique of the law, recently made by one of the oil experts who wrote it, Tariq Shafiq of Petrolog & Associates:

"While all revenue is earmarked to the whole nation, this may not necessarily be the maximum revenue as long as the management of the resources is not optimal," he wrote in the MEES article, which was a call for central planning for Iraq's oil sector. "An optimal management plan can only be based on unbiased allocation after assessing the whole resource and infrastructural base of the country."

He says the regions don't have the "necessary institutions" or "required expertise" to develop and operate their oil fields without the help of the central government -- via the reconstituted Iraq National Oil Co. (Shafiq was founding executive director of INOC in 1964) -- or international oil companies. He fears, however, the regions will then be too reliant on foreign companies.

This is, to speak broadly, the Sunni critique, and it reveals two related things. First, that the Sunnis all this talk of regionalism is orthogonal to the actual development of the oil sector and the enrichment of the country; and, as a result, that the Sunnis don't trust that, in practice, they'll get the equitable -- and that, of course, is in the eye of the beholder -- mechanism for oil revenue the law is supposed to provide. The more the law tilts in favor of centralization, the less the Kurds will accept it, as is already happening; the more it tilts in favor of regionalism, the less the Sunnis will accept it.

In other words, the oil law is a proxy for the ongoing struggle over federalism, with the extremes uniting in order to weaken the Shiites. Resolution of the issue has become secondary -- how the Kurds and the Sunnis would actually write an oil law from such diametrically opposed positions is rather unclear. What's much clearer is that some benchmarks don't really mark benches.

We've all thought about it. It's day two following a humiliating first-round playoff sweep by your rivals. Where to get shwarma? According to Etan Thomas, the answer is 24Seven on 14th and U Street. It's not just for late-night bicycle jousts anymore.

Hussein Shahristani, Iraq's oil minister, announced that the long-awaited, much-heralded oil law has cleared the cabinet. The law centralizes control of Iraq' oil under a state-owned company, and the Kurds -- who have fought very hard for ownership of their prospective oil fields -- came out on Monday with a fresh denouncement of the proposal. Shahristani, for his part, stated that the Kurds "are very happy with the draft law."

If so, they'll clarify that soon enough. Alternatively, Shahristani is sending the oil law to parliament as a way of giving Nouri al-Maliki something to show the Sunni autocrats during the regional confab in Egypt. Whether it will actually pass -- and, for that matter, hold support during implementation -- is irrelevant, since it allows Maliki to say, "See? I'm not trying to hand-deliver Iraq's oil wealth to Iran. Fret not, King Abdullah, over your position in OPEC." Sweat the details later.

Slogger's overview makes the point that nearly everyone not in line with Maliki in general have clucked their teeth at aspects of the bill, either for overall overcentralization (the Kurds), under-centralization in contracting (Sunnis) or giving away the store to foreign companies (more Sunnis and Sadr). Sadr has already pulled out of the Maliki government. The Sunni Accordance Front is considering doing the same. Perhaps Shahristani has secured some so-far-unannounced Sunni buy-in. But though the oil law is considered in the Sunnis' interest -- that's kind of the whole point -- it's not beyond the realm of possibility that the they could join with disaffected Shiites and Kurds to hobble Maliki with a jumble of attacks on the law. They don't have the burden of writing a replacement draft, after all. The outcome here should be a good barometer of Maliki's relative strength and whether reconciliation efforts can actually, you know, reconcile people.

No. 518-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 01, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualties

The Department of Defense announced today the death of three soldiers who were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.They died Apr. 28 in Salman Pak, Iraq, of wounds suffered when their vehicle was struck with an improvised explosive device and small arms fire during combat operations.They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, Ga.

Killed were:

Sgt. Glenn D. Hicks Jr., 24, of College Station, Texas.

Pfc. Jay-D H. Ornsby-Adkins, 21, of Ione, Calif.

Pvt. Cole E. Spencer, 21, of Gays, Ill.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the Fort Benning public affairs office at (706) 545-3512; after hours, call (706) 545-2218.

No. 516-07 IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 01, 2007
Media Contact: (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public/Industry(703) 428-0711

DoD Identifies Army Casualty

The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sgt. Norman L. Tollett, 30, of Columbus, Ohio, died Apr. 28, in Baghdad, Iraq, of wounds suffered when his unit came in contact with enemy forces using small arms fire during combat patrol operations.Tollett was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.

For more information in regard to this release the media can contact the 82nd Airborne Division public affairs office at (910) 432-0661.

A quick hit from George Tenet's At The Center of The Storm on a recurring topic: the CIA's continuing control of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. It shouldn't surprise that we learn... nothing.

Tenet implies that the creation of the service came as the result of Paul Wolfwitz's discontent with the CIA's Baghdad station chief for not "understanding the policy of the U.S. government," an ignorance preventing the chief from "collect(ing) the intelligence to help that policy succeed." Elaboration or context would have been nice here. In any event, Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, nevertheless agreed, apparently in the spring of 2003 -- the chronology is a bit murky -- that Iraq needed an intelligence service. There's no discussion of it being a CIA asset, merely a "counterpart."

Condoleezza Rice worried about the service becoming "another KGB." Tenet's rejoinder, from page 431-2:

Condi's comment was emblematic of the mind-set we were up against. Policy makers didn't seem to want us dealing with anyone who wasn't "politically acceptable" to them on some firm but unannounced scale. Our point was that Americans were dying, jihadists were running all over the country, and it was time to figure out how to vet Iraqis who had the capabilities to do something about it. ...

Gen. Mohammed Shawani, the hero of the Iran-Iraq war, was finally selected to head (INIS) up and build a service drawn from across the country's ethnic, religious and tribal groupings. He spoke frankly to the Bush administration in the months after the liberation of Iraq, highlighting his concerns to the president and vice president about the developing insurgency. He was the first senior Iraqi official to identify and speak of Iran's hand in destabilizing his country. (He continued to serve as the director of Iraq's National Intelligence Service as of early 2007, although Iran and elements of the Iraqi Shia groupings were working to have him removed because of his anti-Iranian stance.)...

That's really all we get, although Shawani will reappear in 2004 to tell his American "counterparts" that the Iraqi army is little more than "a series of militias." There's no effort to explain INIS's relationship with CIA, or why, exactly, Shawani "continued to serve" despite two elected prime ministers' antipathy toward him, or what effect Shawani's INIS actually has on Iraq.