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i guess i remember it wrong i think my memory's st...
passive abject, i'm sure
The morning paper's ink stains my fingers: CCCLI
The morning paper's ink stains my fingers: CCCL
The morning paper's ink stains my fingers: CCCXLIX
The morning paper's ink stains my fingers: CCCXLVIII
your eyeballs feel like pinballs, your tongue feel...
surrender, rend it, it's yours
we're caught in a trap and we can't get out
The morning paper's ink stains my fingers: CCCXLVII
Friday, May 25, 2007
caution is a word that i can't understand:
Very very preliminary read of the SSCI report. In October 2002 and January 2003 -- the January 2003 NIE we knew about -- the intelligence community circulated to the Bush administration several analyses warning that postwar Iraq would most likely be a nightmare.
A post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so. ...Needless to say, there are a ton of political reasons why these warnings weren't heeded, not least of which that they cast serious doubt on the wisdom of invading Iraq. But there's another reason that might be even more determinative in a strict sense. From the SSCI's introduction:
Current and former intelligence officials told the Committee that intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing assessments about postwar Iraq because it was not an issue that was well-suited to intelligence collection. Accordingly, most prewar assessments cite relative few intelligence sources. Analysts based their judgments primarily on regional and country expertise, historical evidence and analytical tradecraft.And you just can't have that, as Frank demonstrated quite excellently. "Regional and country expertise, historical evidence and analytical tradecraft" were considered the tools of a hidebound, unreliable and disloyal intelligence apparatus.